Abstract. Software model checkers based on under-approximations and SMT solvers are very successful at verifying safety (i.e., reachability) properties. They combine two key ideas -(a) concreteness: a counterexample in an under-approximation is a counterexample in the original program as well, and (b) generalization: a proof of safety of an underapproximation, produced by an SMT solver, are generalizable to proofs of safety of the original program. In this paper, we present a combination of automatic abstraction with the under-approximation-driven framework. We explore two iterative approaches for obtaining and refining abstractions -proof based and counterexample based -and show how they can be combined into a unified algorithm. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of Proof-Based Abstraction, primarily used to verify hardware, to Software Verification. We have implemented a prototype of the framework using Z3, and evaluate it on many benchmarks from the Software Verification Competition. We show experimentally that our combination is quite effective on hard instances.
Introduction
Algorithms based on generalizing from under-approximations are very successful at verifying safety properties, i.e., absence of bad executions (e.g., [2, 11, 27] ).
Those techniques use what we call a Bounded Model Checking-Based Model Checking (2BMC). The key idea of 2BMC is to iteratively construct an underapproximation U of the target program P by unwinding its transition relation and check whether U is safe using Bounded Model Checking (BMC) [8] . If U is unsafe, so is P . Otherwise, a proof π U is produced explaining why U is safe. Finally, π U is generalized (if possible) to a safety proof of P . Notable instances of 0: x=0; y=0; z=0; w=0; 1: while(*) { 2:
if(*) {x++; y=y+100;} 3:
else if(*) 4: if (x>=4) {x++; y++;} 5:
else if(y>10*w && z>=100*x) 6: {y=-y;} 7:
t=1; 8:
w=w+t; z=z+(10*t); } 9: assert(!(x>=4 && y<=2)); 2BMC are based on interpolation (e.g., [2, 27] ) or Property Directed Reachability (PDR) [10, 14] (e.g., [11, 22] ).
At the same time, automatic abstraction refinement, such as CounterExample Guided Abstraction Refinement (CEGAR) [12] , is very effective [2, 7, 21] . The idea is to iteratively construct, verify, and refine an abstraction (i.e., an over-approximation) of P based on abstract counterexamples. In this paper, we present Spacer 1 , an algorithm that combines abstraction with 2BMC. For example, consider the safe program P g by Gulavani et al. [19] shown in Fig. 1 . P g is hard for existing 2BMC techniques. For example, µZ engine of Z3 [13] (v4.3.1) that implements Generalized PDR [22] cannot solve it within an hour. However, its abstractionP g obtained by replacing line 7 with a nondeterministic assignment to t is solved by the same engine in under a second. Our implementation of Spacer finds a safe abstraction of P g in under a minute (the transition relation of the abstraction we automatically computed is a non-trivial generalization of that of P g and does not correspond toP g ).
Spacer tightly connects proof-based (PBA) and counterexample-based (CE-GAR) abstraction-refinement schemes. An overview of Spacer is shown in Fig. 2 . The input is a program P with a designated error location er and the output is either SAFE with a proof that er is unreachable, or UNSAFE with a counterexample to er. Spacer is sound, but obviously incomplete, i.e., it is not guaranteed to terminate.
During execution, Spacer maintains an abstraction A of P , and an underapproximation U of A. We require that the safety problem for U is decidable. So, U is obtained by considering finitely many finitary executions of A. Initially, A is any abstraction of P (or P itself) and U is some under-approximation (step 1) of A. In each iteration, the main decision engine, called Solve, takes U and outputs either a proof π U of safety (as an inductive invariant) or a counterexample trace C U of U (step 2). In practice, Solve is implemented by an interpolating SMTsolver (e.g., [18, 24] ), or a generalized Horn Clause solver (e.g., [29, 17, 22] ). If U is safe and π U is also valid for P (step 3), Spacer terminates with SAFE; otherwise, it constructs a new abstractionÂ (step 4) using π U , picks an underapproximationÛ ofÂ (step 1), and goes into the next iteration. If U is unsafe and C U is a feasible trace of P (step 5), Spacer terminates with UNSAFE; otherwise, it refines the under-approximation U to refute C U (step 6) and goes to the next iteration. Spacer is described in Section 4 and a detailed run of the algorithm on an example is given in Section 2.
Note that the left iteration of Spacer (steps 1, 2, 3, 4) is PBA: in each iteration, an under-approximation is solved, a new abstraction based on the proof is computed and a new under-approximation is constructed. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of PBA to Software Model Checking. The right iteration (steps 1, 2, 5, 6) is CEGAR: in each iteration, (an underapproximation of) an abstraction is solved and refined by eliminating spurious counterexamples. Spacer exploits the natural duality between the two.
While Spacer is not complete, each iteration makes progress either by proving safety of a bigger under-approximation, or by refuting a spurious counterexample. Thus, when resources are exhausted, Spacer can provide useful information for other verification attempts and for increasing confidence in the program.
We have implemented Spacer using µZ [22] as Solve (Section 5) and evaluated it on many benchmarks from the 2nd Software Verification Competition 2 (SV-COMP'13). Our experimental results (see Section 6) show that the combination of 2BMC and abstraction outperforms 2BMC on hard benchmarks.
In summary, the paper makes the following contributions: (a) an algorithm, Spacer, that combines abstraction and 2BMC and tightly connects proof-and counterexample-based abstractions, (b) an implementation of Spacer using µZ engine of Z3 and (c) experimental results showing the effectiveness of Spacer.
Overview
In this section, we illustrate Spacer on the program P shown in Fig. 3(a) . Function nd() returns a value non-deterministically and assume(0) aborts an execution. Thus, at least one of the updates on lines 3, 4 and 5 must take place in every iteration of the loop on line 2. Note that the variable c counts down 0: x=0; y=0; z=0; w=0; c=nd(); 1: b=nd(); 2: while (0<c<=b) { 3:
if (nd()) {x++; y=y+100;} 4:
else if (nd() && x>=4) {x++; y++;} 5:
else if (y>10*w && z>=100*x) {y=-y;} 6:
else assume (0); 7:
w++; z=z+10; c--; } 8: assert (!(c==0 && x>=4 && y<=2)); the number of iterations of the loop to 0, upper bounded by b. A restriction to b is an under-approximation of P . For example, adding 'assume(b<=0);' to line 1 corresponds to the under-approximation of P that allows only loopfree executions; adding 'assume(b<=1);' to line 1 corresponds to the underapproximation that allows at most one execution through the loop, etc. While in this example the counter variable c is part of P , we synthesize such variables automatically in practice (see Section 5) .
Semantically, P is given by the transition system shown in Fig 3(b) . The control locations en, lp, and er correspond to lines 0, 2, and 8 in P , respectively. An edge from ℓ 1 to ℓ 2 corresponds to all loop-free executions starting at ℓ 1 and ending at ℓ 2 . For example, the self-loop on lp corresponds to the body of the loop. Finally, every edge is labeled by a formula over current (unprimed) and next-state (primed) variables denoting the semantics of the corresponding executions. Hence, I and E denote the initial and error conditions, respectively, and T denotes the loop body. In the rest of the paper, we do not distinguish between semantic and syntactic representations of programs.
Our goal is to find a safety proof for P , i.e., a labeling π of en, lp and er with a set of formulas (called lemmas) that satisfies safety, initiation and inductiveness:
where τ (ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 ) is the label of edge from ℓ 1 to ℓ 2 , and for an expression X, X ′ is obtained from X by priming all variables. In the following, we refer to Fig. 2 for the steps of the algorithm. Steps 1 and 2. Let U 1 be the under-approximation obtained from P by conjoining (b ≤ 2) to T . It is safe, and suppose that Solve returns the safety proof π 1 , shown in Fig. 5(a) .
Step 3. To check whether π 1 is also a safety proof of the concrete program P , we extract a Maximal Inductive Subset (MIS), I 1 (shown in Fig. 5(b) ), of π 1 , with respect to P . That is, for every location ℓ, I 1 (ℓ) ⊆ π 1 (ℓ), and I 1 satisfies the initiation and inductiveness conditions above. I 1 is an inductive invariant Fig. 3(b) . of P , but is not safe (er is not labeled with ⊥). Hence, π 1 does not contain a feasible proof, and another iteration of Spacer is required.
Step 4. We obtain an abstractionP 1 of P for which, assuming the invariants in I 1 , π 1 is a safety proof for the first two iterations of the loop (i.e., when b ≤ 2). For this example, letP 1 be as shown in Fig. 4(b) . Note thatT 1 has no constraints on the next-state values of z, y and w. This is okay for π 1 as I 1 (lp) already captures the necessary relation between these variables. In other words, whileT 1 is a structural (or syntactic) abstraction [6] , we consider its restriction to the invariants I 1 making it a more expressive, semantic abstraction. The next iteration of Spacer is described below. where a state is a valuation to the tuple (x, y, z, w, c, b). Steps 5 and 6. C 2 is infeasible in P as the last state does not satisfy E.P 1 is refined toP 2 , say as shown in Fig. 4(b) , by adding the missing constraints on y. Steps 1 and 2. Let U 3 be the under-approximation obtained fromP 2 by conjoining (b ≤ 4) ∧ I 1 ∧ I
Step 3. π 3 is a MIS of itself, with respect to P . Thus, it is a safety proof for P and Spacer terminates.
While we have carefully chosen the under-approximations to save space, the abstractions, lemmas and invariants shown above were all computed automatically by our prototype implementation starting with the initial underapproximation of b ≤ 0 and incrementing the upper bound by 1, each iteration. Even on this small example, our prototype, built using µZ, is five times faster than µZ by itself.
Preliminaries
This section defines the terms and notation used in the rest of the paper.
L is the set of control locations, 2. ℓ o ∈ L and ℓ e ∈ L are the unique initial and error locations, 3. V is the set of all program variables (Boolean or Rational), and
is a map from pairs of locations to Boolean expressions over V ∪ V ′ in propositional Linear Rational Arithmetic.
Intuitively, τ (ℓ i , ℓ j ) is the relation between the current values of V at ℓ i and the next values of V at ℓ j on a transition from ℓ i to ℓ j . We refer to τ as the transition relation. Without loss of generality, we assume that ∀ℓ ∈ L τ (ℓ, ℓ o ) = ⊥ ∧ τ (ℓ e , ℓ) = ⊥. We refer to the components of P by a subscript, e.g., L P . Fig. 3(b) shows an example program with L = {en, lp, er}, ℓ o = en, ℓ e = er, V = {x, y, z, w, c, b}, τ (en, lp) = I, τ (lp, lp) = T , τ (lp, er) = E.
Let P = L, ℓ o , ℓ e , V , τ be a program. A control path of P is a finite 3 sequence of control locations ℓ o = ℓ 0 , ℓ 1 , . . . , ℓ k , beginning with the initial location
i.e., each successive and corresponding pair of locations and states satisfy τ . For example, en, lp, lp, lp is a feasible control path of the program in A location ℓ is reachable iff there exists a feasible control path ending with ℓ. P is safe iff ℓ e is not reachable. For example, the program in Fig. 3 (b) is safe. P is decidable, when the safety problem of P is decidable. For example, the program U obtained from P in Fig. 3 (b) by replacing b with 5 is decidable because (a) U has finitely many feasible control paths, each of finite length and (b) Linear Arithmetic is decidable.
Definition 2 (Safety Proof
such that π is safe and inductive, i.e.,
For example, Fig. 5 (c) shows a safety proof for the program in Fig. 3 (b). Note that whenever P has a safety proof, P is safe.
A counterexample to safety is a pair l ,s such thatl is a feasible control path in P ending with ℓ e ands is a corresponding sequence of states satisfying τ alongl. For example,P 2 in Fig. 4 (b) admits the counterexample C 2 shown in (1) in Section 2.
P 1 is called a refinement (i.e., an under-approximation) of P 2 . We say that P 2 strictly abstracts P 1 via σ, denoted
When σ is not important, we drop the subscript.
That is, P 2 abstracts P 1 iff there is a surjective map σ from L 1 to L 2 such that every feasible transition of P 1 corresponds (via σ) to a feasible transition of P 2 . For example, if P 1 is a finite unrolling of P 2 , then σ maps the locations of P 1 to the corresponding ones in P 2 . P 2 strictly abstracts P 1 iff P 1 P 2 and there is no surjection ν for which P 2 ν P 1 . For example, P ≺ idP1 , where P is in Fig. 3 (b) andP 1 is in Fig. 4 
(a).
We extend σ : L 1 → L 2 from locations to control paths in the straightforward way. For a counterexample C = l ,s , we define σ(C ) ≡ σ(l),s . For a transition relation τ on L 2 , we write σ(τ ) to denote an embedding of τ via σ, defined as follows:
The Algorithm
In this section, we describe Spacer at a high-level. Low-level details of our implementation are described in Section 5. The pseudo-code of Spacer is shown in Fig. 6 . The top level routine Spacer decides whether an input program P (passed through the global variable) is safe. It maintains (a) invariants I such that I(ℓ) is a set of constraints satisfied by all the reachable states at location ℓ of P (b) an abstraction A of P , (c) a decidable under-approximation U of A and (d) a surjection σ such that U σ A. Spacer ensures that P id A, i.e., A differs from P only in its transition relation. Let A I denote the restriction of A to the invariants in I by strengthening τ A to λℓ 1 ,
τÛ ≡ σ(τP ) ∧ρ with τP ⇒τP , ρ ⇒ρ, and π is a safety proof ofÛI Spacer assumes the existence of an oracle, Solve, that decides whether U I is safe and returns either a safety proof or a counterexample.
Spacer initializes A to P and I to the empty map (line 1), calls InitU(A) to initialize U and σ (line 2) and enters the main loop (line 3). In each iteration, safety of U I is checked with Solve (line 4). If U I is safe, the safety proof π is checked for feasibility w.r.t. the original program P , as follows. First, π is mined for new invariants of P using ExtractInvs (line 6). Then, if the invariants at ℓ e P are unsatisfiable (line 7), the error location is unreachable and Spacer returns Safe (line 8). Otherwise, A is updated to a new proof-based abstraction via Abstract (line 9), and a new under-approximation is constructed using NextU (line 10). If, on the other hand, U I is unsafe at line 4, the counterexample C is validated using Refine (line 11). If C is feasible, Spacer returns Unsafe (line 13), otherwise, both A and U are refined (lines 20 and 21).
Next, we describe these routines in detail. Throughout, fix U , σ and A such that U σ A.
ExtractInvs. For every ℓ ∈ L, the lemmas of all locations in L U which map to ℓ, via the surjection σ : L U → L P (= L A ), are first collected into R(ℓ) (lines [25] [26] . The disjunction of R(ℓ) is then broken down into conjuncts and stored back in R(ℓ) (lines [27] [28] . For e.g., if R(ℓ) = {φ 1 , φ 2 }, obtain φ 1 ∨ φ 2 ≡ j ψ j and update R(ℓ) to {ψ j } j . Then, the invariants are extracted as the maximal subset of R(ℓ) that is mutually inductive, relative to I, w.r.t. the concrete transition relation τ P . This step uses the iterative algorithm on lines 29-30 and is similar to Houdini [16] . Abstract first constructs an abstractionÛ of U , such that π is a safety proof forÛ I and then, uses the transition relation ofÛ to get the new abstraction. W.l.o.g., assume that τ U is of the form σ(τ A ) ∧ ρ. That is, τ U is an embedding of τ A via σ strengthened with ρ. An abstractionÛ of U is constructed such that τÛ = σ(τ P ) ∧ρ, whereτ P abstracts the concrete transition relation τ P ,ρ abstracts ρ and π provesÛ I (line 16). The new abstraction is then obtained from A by replacing the transition relation byτ P (line 17). NextU returns the next under-approximationÛ to be solved. It ensures that U ≺Û (line 15) , and that the surjections between U ,Û and A compose so that the corresponding transitions in U andÛ map to the same transitions of the common abstraction A. Furthermore, to ensure progress, NextU ensures thatÛ contains more concrete behaviors than U (the last condition on line 15). The helper routine Adapt strengthens the transition relation of an under-approximation by an embedding (line 14). Refine checks if the counterexample C , via σ, is feasible in the original program P using IsFeasible (line 18). If C is feasible, Refine returns saying so (line 23). Otherwise,Â is refined to A to (at least) eliminate C (line 20). Thus, A ≺ idÂ . Finally,Û is strengthened with the refined transition relation via Adapt (line 21).
The following statements show that Spacer is sound and maintains progress. The proofs of the statements are included in the appendix.
Lemma 1 (Inductive Invariants). In every iteration of Spacer, I is inductive with respect to τ P . Theorem 1 (Soundness). P is safe (unsafe) if Spacer returns Safe (Unsafe).
Theorem 2 (Progress). Let A i , U i , and C i be the values of A, U , and C in the i th iteration of Spacer with U i σi A i and letU i denote the concretization of U i , i.e., result of Adapt(U i , τ P , σ i ). Then, if U i+1 exists, 1. if U i is safe, U i+1 has strictly more concrete behaviors, i.e.,U i ≺U i+1 , 2. if U i is unsafe, U i+1 has the same concrete behaviors, i.e.,U i idUi+1 anḋ U i+1 idUi , and 3. if U i is unsafe, C i does not repeat in future, i.e., ∀j > i σ j (C j ) = σ i (C i ).
In this section, we presented the high-level structure of Spacer. Many routines (InitU, ExtractInvs, Abstract, NextU, Refine, IsFeasible) are only presented by their interfaces with their implementation left open. In the next section, we complete the picture by describing the implementation used in our prototype. ℓ 2 ) . In practice, we use optimizations to reduce the number of variables and constraints 4 . This transformation preserves safety as shown below (proof in Appendix).
Implementation
Lemma 2. P is safe iffP is safe, i.e., ifC = l ,s is a counterexample tõ P , projectings onto V gives a counterexample to P ; ifπ is a proof ofP , then π = λℓ · {∀B ≥ 0, C ≥ 0 ϕ | ϕ ∈π(ℓ)} is a safety proof for P .
In the rest of this section, we define our abstractions and under-approximations ofP and describe our implementation of the different routines in Fig. 6 . Abstractions. Recall that τ (P ) = τ ∧τ B . W.l.o.g., assume that τ is transformed to ∃Σ (τ Σ ∧ Σ) for a finite set of fresh Boolean variables Σ that only appear negatively in τ Σ . We refer to Σ as assumptions following SAT terminology [15] . Dropping some assumptions from Σ results in an abstract transition relation, i.e., ∃Σ τ Σ ∧ Σ is an abstraction of τ forΣ ⊆ Σ, denotedτ (Σ). Note that
The only abstractions ofP we consider are the ones which abstract τ and keep τ B unchanged. That is, every abstractionP of P is such thatP idP with τ (P ) =τ (Σ) ∧ τ B for someΣ ⊆ Σ. Moreover, a subsetΣ of Σ induces an abstraction ofP , denotedP (Σ). Under-approximations. An under-approximation is induced by a subset of assumptionsΣ ⊆ Σ, which identifies the abstractionP (Σ), and a mapping bvals : B → N from B to natural numbers, which bounds the number of iterations of every loop inP . The under-approximation, denoted U (Σ, bvals), satisfies U (Σ, bvals) ≺ idP (Σ), with τ (U (Σ, bvals)) =τ (Σ) ∧ τ B (bvals) where τ B (bvals) is obtained from τ B by strengthening all transitions with b∈B b ≤ bvals(b). Solve. We implement Solve (see Fig. 6 ) by transforming the decidable underapproximation U , after restricting by the invariants to U I , to Horn-SMT [22] (the input format of µZ) and passing the result to µZ. Note that this intentionally limits the power of µZ to solve only decidable problems. In Section 6, we compare Spacer with unrestricted µZ.
We implement the routines of Spacer in Fig. 6 by maintaining a set of constraints C as shown in Fig. 7 . Initially, C is Global. Trans encodes the transition
Local relation ofP , using fresh Boolean variables for transitions and locations (E i,j , N i , respectively) enforcing that a location is reachable only via one of its (incoming) edges. Choosing an abstract or concrete transition relation is done by adding a subset of Σ as additional constraints. Invars encodes currently known invariants. They approximate the reachable states by adding constraints for every invariant at a location in terms of current-state variables (3) and next-state variables (4). The antecedent in (3) specifies that at least one transition from ℓ i has been taken implying that the current location is ℓ i and the antecedent in (4) specifies that the next location is ℓ i .
C is modified by each routine as needed by adding and retracting some of the Local constraints (see Fig. 7 ) as discussed below.
For a set of assumption literals A, let Sat(C, A) be a function that checks whether C ∪ A is satisfiable, and if not, returns an unsat coreÂ ⊆ A such that C ∪Â is unsatisfiable.
In the rest of the section, we assume that π is a safety proof of U I (Σ, bvals).
InitU. The initial under-approximation is U (Σ, λb ∈ B 0).
ExtractInvs is implemented by ExtractInvsImpl shown in Fig. 8 . It extracts a Maximal Inductive Subset (MIS) of the lemmas in π w.r.t. the concrete transition relation τ ∧ τ B ofP . First, the constraints Concrete in Fig. 7 are added to C, including all of Σ. Second, the constraints Lemmas in Fig. 7 are added to C, where fresh Boolean variables A ℓ,ϕ and B ℓ,ϕ are used to mark every lemma ϕ at every location ℓ ∈ L. This encodes the negation of the inductiveness condition of a safety proof (see Def. 2).
The MIS of π corresponds to the maximal subset I ⊆ {A ℓ,ϕ } ℓ,ϕ such that C∪I∪{¬B ℓ,ϕ | A ℓ,ϕ ∈ I} is unsatisfiable. I is computed by ExtractInvsImpl in Fig. 8 . Each iteration of ExtractInvsImpl computes a Minimal Unsatisfiable Subset (MUS) to identify (a minimal set of) more non-inductive lemmas (lines 3-6). M , on line 4, indicates the cumulative set of non-inductive lemmas and X, on line 5, indicates all the other lemmas. Mus(C, T, V ) in Fig. 8 iteratively computes a minimal subset, R, of V such that C ∪ T ∪ R is unsatisfiable. Abstract finds aΣ 1 ⊆ Σ such that U I (Σ 1 , bvals) is safe with proof π. The constraints Lemmas in Fig. 7 are added to C to encode the negation of the conditions in Definition 2. Then, the constraints in Bound Vals in Fig. 7 are added to C to encode the under-approximation. This reduces the check for π to be a safety proof to that of unsatisfiability of a formula. Finally, Sat(C, Σ ∪ {A ℓ,ϕ } ℓ,ϕ ∪ {B ℓ,ϕ } ℓ,ϕ ) is invoked. As C is unsatisfiable assuming Σ and using all the lemmas (since π proves U I (Σ, bvals)), it returns an unsat core. Projecting the core onto Σ gives usΣ 1 ⊆ Σ which identifies the new abstraction and, together with bvals, the corresponding new under-approximation. The minimality ofΣ 1 depends on the algorithm for extracting an unsat core, which is part of the SMT engine of Z3 in our case. In practice, we use a Minimal Unsatisfiable Subset (MUS) algorithm to find a minimalΣ 1 . As we treat {A ℓ,ϕ } ℓ,ϕ and {B ℓ,ϕ } ℓ,ϕ as assumption literals, this also corresponds to using only the necessary lemmas during abstraction. NextU. Given the current valuation bvals and the new abstractionΣ, this routine returns U (Σ, λb ∈ B bvals(b) + 1). Refine and IsFeasible. Let U I (Σ, bvals) be unsafe with a counterexample C . We create a new set of constraints C C corresponding to the unrolling of τ Σ ∧ τ B along the control path of C and check Sat(C C , Σ). If the path is feasible inP , we find a counterexample to safety inP . Otherwise, we obtain an unsat coreΣ 1 ⊆ Σ and refine the abstraction toΣ ∪Σ 1 . The under-approximation is refined accordingly with the same bvals.
We conclude the section with a discussion of the implementation choices. NextU is implemented by incrementing all bounding variables uniformly. An alternative is to increment the bounds only for the loops whose invariants are not inductive (e.g., [2, 27] ). However, we leave the exploration of such strategies for future. Our use of µZ is sub-optimal since each call to Solve requires constructing a new Horn-SMT problem. This incurs an unnecessary pre-processing overhead that can be eliminated by a tighter integration with µZ. For Abstract and ExtractInvs, we use a single SMT-context with a single copy of the transition relation of the program (without unrolling it). The context is preserved across iterations of Spacer. Constraints specific to an iteration are added and retracted using the incremental solving API of Z3. This is vital for performance. For Refine and IsFeasible, we unroll the transition relation of the program along the control path of the counterexample trace returned by µZ. We experimented with an alternative implementation that instead validates each individual step of the counterexample using the same global context as Abstract. While this made each refinement step faster, it increased the number of refinements, becoming inefficient overall.
Experiments
We implemented Spacer in Python using Z3 v4.3.1 (with a few modifications to Z3 API 5 ). The implementation and complete experimental results are available at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~akomurav/projects/spacer/home.html.
Benchmarks. We evaluated Spacer on the benchmarks from the systemc, productlines, device-drivers-64 and control-flow-integers categories of SV-COMP'13. Other categories require bit-vector and heap reasoning that are not supported by Spacer. We used the front-end of UFO [3] to convert the benchmarks from C to the Horn-SMT format of µZ.
Overall, there are 1,990 benchmarks (1,591 SAFE, and 399 UNSAFE); 1,382 are decided by the UFO front-end that uses common compiler optimizations to reduce the problem. This left 608 benchmarks (231 SAFE, and 377 UNSAFE).
For the UNSAFE benchmarks, 369 cases are solved by both µZ and Spacer; in the remaining 8 benchmarks, 6 are solved by neither tool, and 2 are solved by µZ but not by Spacer. Fig. 9 shows a scatter plot comparing Spacer with µZ on these 369 cases. Note that, even though abstraction did not help for these benchmarks, hurting significantly in some cases, the benchmarks are easy with Spacer needing at most 3 minutes each.
For the SAFE benchmarks, see Fig. 10 for a scatter plot comparing Spacer with µZ. 176 cases are solved in under a minute by both tools (see the dense set of triangles in the lower left corner of the figure). For them, the difference between Spacer and µZ is not significant to be meaningful. Of the remaining 55 hard benchmarks 42 are solved by either µZ, Spacer or both with a time limit of 15 minutes and 2GB of memory. The rest remain unsolved. All experiments were done on an Intel R Core TM 2 Quad CPU of 2.83GHz and 4GB of RAM.
Results. Table 1 shows the experimental results on the 42 solved benchmarks needing more than a minute of running time. The t columns under µZ and Spacer show the running times in seconds with 'TO' indicating a time-out and a 'MO' indicating a mem-out. The best times are highlighted in bold. The corresponding scatter plot in Fig. 10 shows that the results are mixed for a time bound of 300 seconds (5 minutes). But beyond 5 minutes, abstraction really helps with many benchmarks solved by Spacer when µZ runs out of time (time-outs are indicated by diamonds). The couple of benchmarks where Spacer runs out of time become better than µZ using a different setting, as discussed later. Overall, abstraction helps for hard benchmarks. Benchmark µZ Spacer t t B a f am tp Bp (sec) (sec) (%) (%)
Benchmark µZ Spacer t t B a f am tp Bp (sec) (sec) (%) (%) stars in the far right of Fig. 10 ). Note that gcnr, under misc, in the table is the example from Fig. 1 . The B column in the table shows the final values of the loop bounding variables under the mapping bvals, i.e., the maximum number of loop iterations (of any loop) that was necessary for the final safety proof. Surprisingly, they are very small in many of the hard instances in systemc and product-lines categories.
Columns a f and a m show the sizes of the final and maximal abstractions, respectively, measured in terms of the number of the original constraints used. Note that this only corresponds to the syntactic abstraction (see Section 4). The final abstraction done by Spacer is very aggressive. Many constraints are irrelevant with often, more than 50% of the original constraints abstracted away. Note that this is in addition to the aggressive property-independent abstraction done by the UFO front-end. Finally, the difference between a f and a m is insignificant in all of the benchmarks.
Another approach to Abstract is to restrict abstraction to state-variables by making assignments to some next-state variables non-deterministic, as done by Vizel et al. [30] in a similar context. This was especially effective for ssh and ssh-simplified categories -see the entries marked with '*' under column t.
An alternative implementation of Refine is to concretize the under-approximation (by refiningΣ to Σ) whenever a spurious counterexample is found. This is analogous to Proof-Based Abstraction (PBA) [28] in hardware verification. Run-time for PBA and the corresponding final values of the bounding variables are shown in columns t p and B p of Table 1 , respectively. While this results in more timeouts, it is significantly better in 14 cases (see the entries marked with ' †' under column t p ), with 6 of them comparable to µZ and 2 (viz., toy and elev_1_31) significantly better than µZ.
See Fig. 11 for a scatter plot using the best running times for Spacer of all the three variants described above.
We conclude this section by comparing our results with UFO [3] -the winner of the 4 categories at SV-COMP'13. The competition version of UFO runs several engines in parallel, including engines based on Abstract Interpretation, Predicate Abstraction and 2BMC with interpolation. UFO outperforms Spacer and µZ in ssh and product-lines categories by an order of magnitude. They are difficult for 2BMC, but easy for Abstract Interpretation and Predicate Abstraction, respectively. Even so, note that Spacer finds really small abstractions for these categories upon termination. However, in the systemc category both Spacer and µZ perform better than UFO by solving hard instances (e.g., tk_ring_08 and tk_ring_09) that are not solved by any tool in the competition. Moreover, Spacer is faster than µZ. Thus, while Spacer itself is not the best tool for all benchmarks, it is a valuable addition to the state-of-the-art verification engines.
Related work
There is a large body of work on 2BMC approaches both in hardware and software verification. In this section, we briefly survey the most related work.
The two most prominent approaches to 2BMC combine BMC with interpolation (e.g., [2, 26, 27] ) or with inductive generalization (e.g., [10, 11, 14, 22] ). Although our implementation of Spacer is based on inductive generalization (the engine of µZ), it can be implemented on top of an interpolation-based engine as well.
Proof-based Abstraction (PBA) was first introduced in hardware verification to leverage the power of SAT-solvers to focus on relevant facts [20, 28] . Over the years, it has been combined with CEGAR [4, 5] , interpolation [5, 25] , and PDR [23] . To the best of our knowledge, Spacer is the first application of PBA to software verification.
The work of Vizel et al. [30] , in hardware verification, that extends PDR with abstraction is closest to ours. However, Spacer is not tightly coupled with PDR, which makes it more general, but possibly, less efficient. Nonetheless, Spacer allows for a rich space of abstractions, whereas Vizel et al. limit themselves to state variable abstraction.
Finally, Ufo [2,1] also combines abstraction with 2BMC, but in an orthogonal way. In Ufo, abstraction is used to guess the depth of unrolling (plus useful invariants), BMC to detect counterexamples, and interpolation to synthesize safe inductive invariants. While Ufo performs well on many competition benchmarks, combining it with Spacer will benefit on the hard ones.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present an algorithm, Spacer, that combines Proof-Based Abstraction (PBA) with CounterExample Guided Abstraction Refinement (CE-GAR) for verifying safety properties of sequential programs. To our knowledge, this is the first application of PBA to software verification. Our abstraction technique combines localization with invariants about the program. It is interesting to explore alternatives for such a semantic abstraction.
While our presentation is restricted to non-recursive sequential programs, the technique can be adapted to solving the more general Horn Clause Satisfiability problem and extended to verifying recursive and concurrent programs [17] .
We have implemented Spacer in Python using Z3 and its GPDR engine µZ. The current implementation is an early prototype. It is not heavily optimized and is not tightly integrated with µZ. Nonetheless, the experimental results on 4 categories of the 2nd Software Verification Competition show that Spacer improves on both µZ and the state-of-the-art.
Program with a nested loop and its corresponding bounded transition constraints.
A Transformation of P toP
The details of the transformation of an input program P toP by introducing counter variables is discussed below. First, we construct a Weak Topological Order (WTO) [9] of P , which is a well-parenthesized total order of L, denoted <, without two consecutive open brackets, satisfying the following condition. Let the locations within a matching open-close bracket pair constitute a component and let the smallest location w.r.t < in a component be its head. Let hds(ℓ) be the outside-in list of the heads of components containing ℓ.
Intuitively, < is a total order of L such that each component identifies a loop in P , the head of a component identifies the entry location of the loop and hds(ℓ) denotes the outside-in list of nested loops containing ℓ. Condition (3) says that a back-edge, w.r.t <, leads to the head of a component containing the source of the edge, denoting the start of a new iteration of the corresponding loop. For example, Fig. 12 shows a program with two loops, an outer loop ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 , ℓ 3 and an inner loop ℓ 2 . One possible WTO for this program is "ℓ o (ℓ 1 (ℓ 2 )ℓ 3 )ℓ e " with ℓ 1 and ℓ 2 as the heads of the two components. Without loss of generality, assume that ℓ o is always the smallest and ℓ e is always the largest location of a WTO. Bound Variables. Next, we introduce a set C of rational variables, one per head of a component, and the corresponding partial mapping ctr : L ⇀ C. Intuitively, ctr(ℓ) is the number of iterations (completed or remaining, depending on whether we are counting up or down, respectively) of the component whose head is ℓ. Also, let B be another set of rational variables, and bound : C → B be a bijection (i.e., |B| = |C|). Informally, bound(c) denotes the upper bound of c. For example, in Fig. 12 we have
, and τ B (ℓ i , ℓ j ) is a set of constraints defined as follows, assuming c j = ctr(ℓ j ) and b j = bound(c j ):
Entry: ℓ i < ℓ j and ℓ j is a head, i.e., entering a new component (e.g., E 1 and E 2 in Fig. 12 ). Then, τ B (ℓ i , ℓ j ) contains a constraint corresponding to c j being assigned non-deterministically.
Re-entry: ℓ j ≤ ℓ i , i.e., re-entering a component via a back-edge (e.g., R 1 and R 2 in Fig. 12 ). Then, τ B (ℓ i , ℓ j ) contains the constraint (0 ≤ c
, it decrements c j as long as it is not zero.
Exit: ℓ i < ℓ j ∧ hds(ℓ i ) ⊃ hds(ℓ j ), i.e., exiting (one or more) components containing ℓ i (e.g., X 1 and X 2 in Fig. 12) . Then, for each h ∈ hds(ℓ i ) \ hds(ℓ j ), τ B (ℓ i , ℓ j ) contains the constraint ctr(h) = 0.
Pass-on. For each h ∈ hds(ℓ j )\{ℓ j }, τ B (ℓ i , ℓ j ) contains the constraint ctr(h) = ctr(h) ′ . Thus, when the transition is inside a component the current value of its counter is remembered. See τ B for the transitions E 2 , R 1 and X 1 in Fig. 12 .
In other words, a counter is assigned a non-deterministic initial value when entering its component, and decremented until zero before exiting. Since the bound variables (i.e., B) are unconstrained,P and P are equivalent w.r.t. safety, as stated by Lemma 2.
B Proof Sketch of Lemma 1
Initially, I is empty, denoting an invariant of ⊤ for every location, which is clearly inductive. The only update to I is on line 31. As π in ExtractInvs is a safety proof, the only invariant which can be added to ℓ o is equivalent to ⊤. For every other location, the added invariants are inductive relative to I which follows from the failure of the condition on line 29. Thus, I remains inductive.
⊓ ⊔
C Proof of Theorem 1
If Spacer returns Safe (line 8), the condition on line 7 and Lemma 1 imply that I is a safety proof for P . Thus, P is safe. If Spacer returns Unsafe (line 13), a feasible counterexample has been found (line 12). Thus, P is unsafe. ⊓ ⊔
D Proof of Lemma 2
SupposeP is unsafe and there is a feasible control path to ℓ e and a corresponding state sequence. Now, projecting the state sequence from V ∪ C ∪ B to V clearly satisfies τ for every pair of locations asP only strengthens the transitions with additional constraints (τ B ). This gives us a counterexample for P and P is unsafe. Now, assume thatP is safe with a safety proofπ. We show that π : L → 2 BExpr(V ) such that for all ℓ ∈ L, π(ℓ) ≡ {∀B ≥ 0, C ≥ 0 ϕ | ϕ ∈π(ℓ)} is a safety proof for P . Note that the quantifiers can be eliminated for Linear Rational Arithmetic. It suffices to show the three conditions of Definition 2.
π(ℓ e ) ≡ ϕ∈π(ℓ e ) ∀B ≥ 0, C ≥ 0 ϕ ≡ ∀B ≥ 0, C ≥ 0 ϕ∈π(ℓ e ) ϕ. As ϕ∈π(ℓ e ) ϕ ⇒ ⊥, π(ℓ e ) ⇒ ⊥ and the first condition is satisfied. As ⊤ ⇒ π(ℓ o ), ⊤ ⇒ ϕ for every ϕ ∈π(ℓ o ) and in particular, ⊤ ⇒ ∀B ≥ 0, C ≥ 0 ϕ. Therefore, ⊤ ⇒ π(ℓ o ) satisfying the second condition.
Abstract(A i , U i , π)
NextU(A i+1 ,Û i ) (a) Ui is safe.
Refine(A i , U i , C i ) (b) Ui+1 is unsafe. Let s, s ′ be a pair of current and next states satisfying π(ℓ i ) ∧ τ (ℓ i , ℓ j ) for some ℓ i , ℓ j ∈ L. We need to prove that ∀B ≥ 0, C ≥ 0 ϕ is true for s ′ , for every ϕ ∈π(ℓ j ). Let b ′ , c ′ be arbitrary non-negative values for B, C, respectively. One can easily show that τ B (ℓ i , ℓ j ) is invertible for non-negative values of the postvariables and let b, c be the values of the pre-variables corresponding to b ′ , c ′ . But then, for b, c and s, we know that π(ℓ i ) is true. Given thatπ is a proof of P , it follows that ϕ is true for b ′ , c ′ and s ′ .
E Proof of Theorem 2
In the following, we sometimes refer to the components of a program P by application, e.g., L(P ), in addition to using subscripts.
Lemma 3. Let U 1 σ1 A with τ (U 1 ) = σ 1 (τ A ) ∧ ρ 1 . If U 1 µ U 2 σ2 A with σ 1 = σ 2 • µ, there exists ρ 2 such that τ (U 2 ) = σ 2 (τ A ) ∧ ρ 2 and ρ 1 ⇒ µ(ρ 2 ).
Proof Sketch. Let τ (U 2 ) = σ 2 (τ A ) ∧ ρ (such a ρ can always be found, as τ (U 2 ) ⇒ σ 2 (τ A )). As U 1 µ U 2 , we have that τ (U 1 ) ⇒ µ(τ (U 2 )). Together with σ 1 = σ 2 • µ, we obtain σ 1 (τ A ) ∧ ρ 1 ⇒ σ 1 (τ A ) ∧ µ(ρ). It can be easily shown that ρ 1 ⇒ µ(ρ 2 ). Furthermore, it can be shown, using
1. U i+1 is obtained from U i after a call to Abstract followed by NextU, as shown in Fig. 13(a) . For U j , the figure also shows ρ j in brackets such that τ (U j ) = σ j (τ (A j ))∧ρ j . Abstract ensures that ρ i ⇒ρ i and Lemma 3 guarantees the existence of a ρ i+1 withρ i ⇒ µ(ρ i+1 ). Together, ρ i ⇒ µ(ρ i+1 ). Further, NextU requires σ i = σ i+1 • µ. Then,U i µUi+1 , as shown below.
